Tuesday, December 27, 2011

the force of reason

Particular reasons have particular normative force which we are bound to respect. So, will each reason's particular force be a constant between all people, contexts, and times?

Suppose not. Then a reason's force may vary in different contexts, for different people, or at different times. Will this variation of force be arbitrary or not?

If it will be arbitrary, then how could the force which a particular reason has in a particular context bind us to respect it? In any cases where a reason appeared to us to have force, we would have to think that the force in that case was merely arbitrary, and if there is anything we don't respect, it is the arbitrary. But we are bound to respect the force which particular reasons have, for the people, and in the contexts, and at the times at which the reasons have that force. So the variation in a reason's force cannot be arbitrary.

But if the variation in a reason's force cannot be arbitrary, it must be principled, and non-arbitrary. It must be reasoned! Which is to say, there must be further reasons for a reasons having the variable force which it does in various contexts, and at different times, and for different people.
 
Will the force of this further reason vary across contexts (or meta-contexts)? Suppose not...
 
There is an infinite regress here if we go down this path of saying that each reason's particular force will not be a constant between all people, contexts, and times. So we had better backtrack. We had better say that each reason's particular force will be a constant between all people, contexts, and times. 
 
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Does the above bit of reasoning work in its own terms or not?